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We introduce a new property for mixing layers which guarantees pro-
tection against algebraic attacks based on the imprimitivity of the
group generated by the round functions. Mixing layers satisfying this
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terize such mixing layers by providing a list of necessary and sufficient
conditions on the structure of their underlying binary matrices. Then
we show how several families of linear maps are non-type-preserving,
including the mixing layers of AES, GOST and PRESENT. Finally
we prove that the group generated by the round functions of an SPN
cipher with addition modulo 2n as key mixing function is primitive if
its mixing layer satisfies this property.
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1 Introduction
Most modern block ciphers are iterated block ciphers, i.e. are obtained as composi-
tion of round functions, and belong to two families of cryptosystems, i.e. Substitu-
tion Permutation Networks (SPN) and Feistel Networks (FN). Within each round
three permutations of the plaintext space operate, i.e. a non-linear layer and a
linear layer which respectively perform confusion and diffusion (see [26]) and a key
mixing function which combines the message with the corresponding round key.
Most SPN’s use the XOR as key mixing, but in many Feistel Networks (e.g. MARS
[8], GOST [17], RC6 [24], SEA [27]) and in other block ciphers not belonging to
these two families (e.g. IDEA [21]) the key mixing function is the addition modulo
2n, for some integer n.
Using addition modulo 2n as key mixing function may increase the nonlinearity
of a round function. Intuitively, one could take that adding an extra nonlinear
layer increases the complexity of attacks. Actually in [22] the authors prove from
a theoretical point of view that adopting a key mixing defined by an addition
modulo 2n can help to prevent linear cryptanalysis. Then they consider two toy
SPN’s, GPig1 and GPig2, with the same structure but with key mixing respectively
defined by XOR and addition modulo 2n and check from an experimental point of
view that the first one is weaker than the latter against linear cryptanalysis. On
the other hand in [20] the authors investigate how the use of addition modulo 2n in
round functions influences algebraic attacks. Also in [16] statistical and algebraic
properties of addition modulo a power of two are studied from a cryptographic
point of view.
In this paper, we aim to investigate which properties of the mixing layer are
useful to avoid particular classes of algebraic vulnerabilities on an SPN which uses
addition modulo 2n as key mixing function. Some algebraic properties of the round
functions can indeed hide some weaknesses of the corresponding cipher. Firstly, in
1975 Coppersmith and Grossman [14] defined a family of functions which can be
used as round functions of a block cipher and studied the permutation group gen-
erated by those. Then it has been found out that some group-theoretical properties
can reveal weaknesses of the cipher itself. For example, if such group is too small,
then the cipher is vulnerable to birthday-paradox attacks (see [19]). Recently, in
[10] the authors proved that if such group is of affine type, then it is possible to
embed a dangerous trapdoor on the cipher. More relevant, in [23] Paterson built
a DES-like cipher whose encryption functions generate an imprimitive group and
showed how the knowledge of this trapdoor can be turned into an efficient attack
to the cipher. For this reason, a branch of research in symmetric cryptography is
focused on showing that the group generated by the encryption functions of a given
cipher is primitive (see [3, 4, 5, 9, 12, 13, 25, 28, 29, 30]).
Our aim is to guarantee protection against algebraic attacks based on the im-
primitivity of the group generated by the round functions of block ciphers which
use addition modulo 2n as key mixing function. We do so by identifying a neces-
sary and sufficient property of the structure of the binary matrix associated to the
mixing layer, under the only hypothesis of S-Box invertibility. In particular, we
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give the definition of type-preserving matrix and we prove that the group generated
by the round functions of an SPN cipher with addition modulo 2n as key mixing
function is primitive if its mixing layer is not type-preserving.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give our notation, as well
as some basic definitions and results concerning block ciphers and primitive per-
mutations groups. In Section 3 we present a new property for mixing layer, called
non-type-preserving. Then, after having proved our result regarding the necessary
and sufficient conditions for a mixing layer to be non-type-preserving, we show that
some known mixing layers, such as those employed in GOST [17], PRESENT [7],
AES [15] and GPig2 [22], are non-type-preserving. Even though the key mixing of
AES and PRESENT is the classical XOR addition instead of the addition modulo
2n, their mixing layers are real-life examples of non-type-preserving matrices. In
Section 4, we prove that an SPN which uses addition modulo 2n as key mixing
function and a non-type-preserving matrix as mixing layer is primitive. Finally, we
use a non-type-preserving mixing layer to extend a GOST-like cipher, defined in
[5], and we prove its primitivity if the S-Boxes are invertible.
2 Notation and preliminary results
2.1 Permutation groups
We recall some basic notions from permutation group theory. LetG be a finite group
acting on the set V . For each g ∈ G and v ∈ V we denote the action of g on v as vg.
We denote by vG = {vg ∣ v ∈ G} the orbit of v ∈ V and by Gv = {g ∈ G ∣ vg = v} its
stabilizer. The group G is said to be transitive on V if for each v,w ∈ V there exists
g ∈ G such that vg = w. A partition B of V is trivial if B = {V } or B = {{v} ∣ v ∈ V },
and G-invariant if for any B ∈ B and g ∈ G it holds Bg ∈ B. Any non-trivial and
G-invariant partition B of V is called a block system. In particular any B ∈ B is
called an imprimitivity block. The group G is primitive in its action on V if G is
transitive and there exists no block system. Otherwise, the group G is imprimitive
in its action on V . We remind the following well-known results whose proofs may
be found e.g. in [11].
Lemma 2.1. A block of imprimitivity is the orbit vH of a proper subgroup H < G
that properly contains the stabilizer Gv, for some v ∈ V .
Lemma 2.2. If T is a transitive subgroup of G, then a block system for G is also
a block system for T .
2.2 Substitution Permutation Networks
Let n ∈ N and let V = Fn2 be the plaintext space. Let Sym(V ) be the symmetric
group acting on V , i.e. the group of all permutations on V , and by AGL(V ) the
group of all affine permutations of V , which is a primitive maximal subgroup of
Sym(V ), i.e., AGL(V ) is a primitive proper subgroup such that there is no other
primitive proper subgroup containing it.
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A block cipher C is a family of key-dependent permutations of V
{εK ∣ εK ∶ V → V, K ∈ K} ⊆ Sym(V ),
where K is the key space, and ∣V ∣ ≤ ∣K∣. The permutation εK is called the encryption
function induced by the master key K. Let ϕ ∶ {1, . . . , r} × K Ð→ V be a public
procedure known as key-schedule, such that ϕ(h,K) is the h-th round key, given
the master key K. The block cipher C is called an iterated block cipher if there
exists r ∈ N such that for each K ∈ K the encryption function εK is the composition
of r round functions, i.e. εK = εϕ(1,K) εϕ(2,K) . . . εϕ(r,K). Each round function
εϕ(h,K) is a permutation of V depending on the h-th round key.
Most modern iterated block ciphers belong to two families of cryptosystems: Sub-
stitution Permutation Networks, briefly SPN (see e.g. SERPENT [1], PRESENT
[7], AES [15]) and Feistel Networks, briefly FN (see e.g. Camelia [2], GOST [17]).
In this paper we mainly deal with ciphers of SPN type and we define a class of
round functions for iterated block ciphers which is large enough to include the
round functions of classical SPN’s.
Let V = V1 × V2 × . . . × Vδ where, for 1 ≤ j ≤ δ, dim(Vj) = m, with m dividing n,
and × represents the Cartesian product of vector spaces. The spaces Vj ’s are called
bricks.
Definition 2.3. For each k ∈ V , a round function induced by k is a map εk ∈
Sym(V ) where εk = γλσk and
• γ ∶ V → V is a non-linear permutation, called parallel S-Box, which acts in
parallel way on each Vj , i.e.
(x1, x2, . . . , xn)γ = ((x1, . . . , xm)γ1, . . . , (xm(δ−1)+1, . . . , xn)γδ) ;
the maps γj ∶ Vj → Vj are traditionally called S-Boxes,
• λ ∈ Sym(V ) is a linear map, called mixing layer,
• σk ∶ V → V is the key mixing function, that is a permutation of V combining
the message with the corresponding round key k.
Since studying the role of the key-schedule is out of the scopes of this paper, we
can simply suppose that round keys are randomly-generated vectors in V .
Usually, the key mixing function of well-established SPN’s, such as AES, PRESENT,
SERPENT, is σk ∶ x ↦ x + k, where + is the usual bitwise XOR. Note that SPN’s
featuring a XOR-based key addition have been also called Translation-Based ci-
phers in [13]. In many other ciphers (e.g. MARS [8], GOST [17], IDEA [21], RC6
[24], SEA [27]) the key mixing is the addition modulo 2m, for some integer m. This
kind of key mixing function may be used to increase the nonlinearity of a round
function (see for example [22]). In particular, in this work we are interested in
SPN’s which combine the message with the key by the addition modulo 2dim(V )
(see [20, 22]).
Definition 2.4. We denote by SPNmod an SPN operating on the plaintext space
V in which the key mixing function is the addition modulo 2n, where n = dim(V ).
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2.3 Group generated by the round functions and Primitivity
Besides the classical statistical attacks (e.g. differential and linear cryptanalysis),
it is proved that also some algebraic attacks can be effective and dangerous (see, for
instance, [10, 19, 23]). In this paper we focus on a particular attack, described in
[23], based on the imprimitivity of the permutation group generated by the round
functions of a block cipher.
Let C = {εK ∣ K ∈ K} ⊆ Sym(V ) be an r-round iterated block cipher. Several
researchers have shown in recent years that the group generated by the encryption
functions of a block cipher
Γ(C)def= ⟨εK ∣K ∈ K⟩ ≤ Sym(V )
can reveal weaknesses of the cipher itself (see for example [10, 19, 23]). However,
the study of Γ(C) is not an easy issue in general, since it strongly depends on
the key-schedule function (for an example of a key-schedule related study, see [6]).
Hence the research focuses on the group generated by the round functions
Γ∞(C)def= ⟨εh,K ∣ 1 ≤ h ≤ r,K ∈ K⟩,
where all the possible round keys for round h are considered as varying K ∈ K.
Such group contains Γ(C) and allows to ignore the effect of the key-schedule.
In our case C is an r-round SPNmod cipher and the i-th round function is
εi,K = γλσKi , where Ki is the i-th round key derived by the key schedule
K → V r
K ↦ (K1, . . . ,Kr),
which we suppose surjective w.r.t. any round.
The corresponding group generated by the round functions is
Γ∞
def= ⟨γλσKi ∣ 1 ≤ i ≤ r,K ∈ K⟩.
Throughout this paper, sometimes we will denote γλ with ρ.
Note that we can consider two group structures on V . The first operation is
the bitwise XOR, which will be denoted by ⊕ and which makes V into a vector
space over F2.
The second operation, denoted by ⊞, is the sum modulo 2n. That is, we represent
a, b ∈ V as
a = (a0, a1, . . . , an−1), b = (b0, b1, . . . , bn−1),
with ai, bi ∈ {0,1} integers, and let
a ⊞ b = (c0, c1, . . . , cn−1),
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where
(a0 + a12 + a222 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + an−12n−1) + (b0 + b12 + b222 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + bn−12n−1) ≡
≡ c0 + c12 + c222 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + cn−12n−1 (mod 2n),
with ci ∈ {0,1} integers. (Here + denotes the ordinary sum of integers.) Therefore
V under ⊞ is equivalent to the group Z2n of integers modulo 2n, and we will denote
it by (Z2n ,⊞).
We recall the following elementary fact we will be using repeatedly without further
mention.
Lemma 2.5. The subgroups of (Z2n ,⊞) are linearly ordered; they are ⟨ 2q ⟩, for
0 ≤ q ≤ n.
Now we prove the first property of the group generated by the round functions
of an SPNmod cipher. Let
T def= T (V ) = {σk ∶ v ↦ v ⊞ k ∣ k ∈ V }
be the group of ⊞-translations on V . Note that T transitively acts on V .
Lemma 2.6.
Γ∞ = ⟨T , ρ ⟩ .
In particular, Γ∞ acts transitively on V .
Proof. If we set k = 0, then ρσ0 = ρ ∈ Γ∞, and so ρ−1 ∈ Γ∞. Finally for all k ∈ V , we
have ρ−1ρσk = σk ∈ Γ∞.
Since the map v ↦ σv is an isomorphism (V,⊞) → T , so we have the following well
known result
Lemma 2.7 ([11]). The subgroups of T are of the form
{σu ∶ u ∈ U} ,
where U is a subgroup of (V,⊞).
Lemma 2.8 ([11]). If Γ∞ acting on V has a block system, then this consists of the
cosets of a ⊞-subgroup of V , that is, it is of the form
{W ⊞ v ∶ v ∈ V } ,
where W is a non-trivial, proper subgroup of (V,⊞).
Imprimitivity attack
The cryptanalysts’ interest into the imprimitivity of the group generated by the
round functions of a block cipher arises from the study performed in [23], where it
is shown how the imprimitivity of the group can be exploited to construct a trapdoor
that may be hard to detect. In particular, the author gives an example of a DES-like
cipher which can be easily broken since its round functions generate an imprimitive
group, but which is resistant to both linear and differential cryptanalysis.
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2.4 Some other definitions and known results
Now we will recall some preliminary results proved in [5], and to do so we will adopt
the same notation introduced therein.
We shall denote
• a subset of Fm2 of cardinality 1 by a white box ;
• a subset of Fm2 of cardinality 1 < t < 2m by a ruled box ;
• the full set Fm2 by a black box.
We will say that a box has white, ruled or black type.
Definition 2.9. Let D be a subset of
F
n
2 = V1 × V2 × ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ × Vδ,
where each space Vi has dimension m. The type of D will be a sequence of δ white,
ruled or black boxes, where the i-th box represents the projection of D on Vi.
Remark 2.10 (Remark 4.9 in [5]). According to Lemma 2.5, a subgroup D of Z2n
is of the form ⟨ 2q ⟩, for some 0 ≤ q < n. Hence a subgroup D = ⟨ 2q ⟩ of Z2n has one
of the following two types.
1. When q ≡ 0 (mod m), the subgroup has nw white boxes and δ − nw black
boxes, where 0 ≤ nw ≤ δ such that q = nwm. Note that there are no white
boxes when q = 0 (the subgroup is the full group Z2n), and there are no black
boxes when q = n (the subgroup is {0}).
2. When q /≡ 0 (mod m), there is a ruled box which is the box containing the
q-th bit.
Due to Remark 2.10, we can associate to the type of any subgroup D in Z2n the
triple (nw, nr, nb), where nw, nr and nb are respectively the number of white, ruled
and black boxes. We have the following bounds:
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
nw + nr + nb = δ
0 ≤ nw ≤ δ
0 ≤ nr ≤ 1
0 ≤ nb ≤ δ
(1)
With a slight abuse of notation, we use the triple (nw, nr, nb) to denote the type
of D.
In the next lemma, proved in [5], we consider the behavior of the modular sum⊞ with respect to types.
Lemma 2.11. If D is a subgroup of Z2n and v ∈ Z2n , then D and v ⊞D have the
same type.
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3 Type-preserving matrices
In this section we study the diffusion properties of an invertible mixing layer λ,
namely how the multiplication by a full-rank binary matrix Λ mixes the bricks
V1, . . . , Vδ . To do so, we consider Λ to be a δ × δ block matrix whose blocks are
binary square matrices of order m:
Λ =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Λ1,1 ⋯ Λ1,δ⋮ ⋮
Λδ,1 ⋯ Λδ,δ
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
We will also use the notation Λ(i1,j1)∶(i2,j2) for the submatrices of Λ:
Λ(i1,j1)∶(i2,j2) ∶=
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Λi1,j1 ⋯ Λi1,j2⋮ ⋮
Λi2,j1 ⋯ Λi2,j2
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
Observe that if Λi,j = 0 whenever i ≠ j, i.e. Λ is a diagonal block matrix, then γλ
is a parallel map.
Our interest lies in the image of D ⊆ Fn2 through the mixing layer, thus we will
work with the set Im∣Dλ = {vΛ ∶ v ∈ D}. In many cases we will need to work with
submatrices of Λ, and for the sake of simplicity we will write Im∣DΛ(i1,j1)∶(i2,j2)
to denote the restriction of the image Im (Λ(i1,j1)∶(i2,j2)) to the set obtained by
projecting D on the coordinates corresponding to the boxes j1, . . . , j2.
We will study which properties of Λ imply
type(Im∣Dλ) = type(D). (2)
Definition 3.1. A matrix Λ ∈ GL(Fn2 ), or equivalently the corresponding mixing
layer λ, satisfying equation (2) for any D ⊆ Fn2 , is called type-preserving. Vice
versa, if Λ is not type-preserving, then we say that it is non-type-preserving.
Remark 3.2. In Section 4 we prove that the non-type-preserving property of a
mixing layer given in the previous definition is useful to avoid imprimitivity attacks
on block ciphers with the following structure:
• SPN with addition 2n as key mixing function (Theorem 4.1),
• GOST-like with addition 2n/2 as key mixing function and invertible S-Boxes
(Theorem 4.3),
where n is the length of the whole block.
In this paper we are mainly interested in the subsets D of Fn2 , such as the
subgroups of Z2n , with type (nw, nr, nb) satisfying equation (1). Therefore in the
remaining part of this section the subsets D of Fn2 are all of this kind. Observe that
any v ∈ D can be written as the concatenation (vw ∣vr ∣vb), where the lengths of vw,
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vr and vb are determined by the type of D. In particular, vw ∈ Fmnw2 , vr ∈ Fmnr2
and vb ∈ Fmnb2 , with the following properties due to the structure of D:
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
∣{vw ∶ ∃v = (vw ∣vr ∣vb) ∈D}∣ = 1
2 ≤ ∣{vr ∶ ∃v = (vw ∣vr ∣vb) ∈D}∣ ≤ 2mnr − 1∣{vb ∶ ∃v = (vw ∣vr ∣vb) ∈D}∣ = 2mnb .
Now we can state our main result, whose proof is a consequence of several
lemmas.
Theorem 3.3. The mixing layer λ is type-preserving with respect to the subsets
of Fn2 with type (nw, nr, nb) satisfying equation (1) if and only if there exists an
integer nw ∈ {0, . . . , δ} for which either equation
Λ(nw+1,1)∶(δ,nw) = 0 (3)
or the following four properties
(a) Λ(nw+2,1)∶(δ,nw) = 0,
(b) Λ(nw+1,1)∶(nw+1,nw) is not a full-rank matrix,
(c) 2 ≤ ∣Im∣D (Λ(nw+1,nw+1)∶(δ,nw+1))∣ < 2m(δ−nw−1),
(d) ∣Im∣D (Λ(nw+1,nw+2)∶(δ,δ))∣ = 2m(δ−nw−1)
are satisfied.
Proof. By equation (1) we have four cases:
1. type(D) = (0,0, δ)
2. type(D) = (δ,0,0)
3. type(D) = (nw,0, δ − nw)
4. type(D) = (nw,1, δ − nw − 1)
Cases 1 and 2 are trivial, namely all invertible linear maps, i.e. all full-rank matri-
ces, preserve these types: type(D) = (δ,0,0) implies type(Im∣Dλ) = (δ,0,0), and
type (D) = (0,0, b) implies type(Im∣Dλ) = (0,0, δ). We will focus on the remaining
two cases, starting by case 3.
Lemma 3.4. Let type(D) = type(Im∣Dλ) = (nw,0, δ −nw), where nw ∈ {1, . . . , δ −
1}. Then
Λ(nw+1,1)∶(δ,nw) = 0. (4)
Proof of Lemma 3.4. We assume type(D) = (nw,0, δ−nw) and Λ(nw+1,1)∶(δ,nw) ≠ 0.
We consider two vectors v = (vw ∣vb) and v′ = (v′w ∣v′b) inD, with v ∈ ker(Λ(nw+1,1)∶(δ,nw))
while v′ is outside of it. Observe that the structure of D implies that vw = v′w,
and by applying λ to both we obtain vΛ = (vwΛ(1,1)∶(nw,nw)∣0) and v′Λ = vΛ ⊕(0∣vbΛ(nw+1,1)∶(δ,nw)), here in both cases 0 denotes a string of nb zeros. Since the
two vectors are different, type(Im∣Dλ) ≠ (nw,0, δ − nw), which contradicts the
hypotheses of the Lemma.
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The above lemma gives us a necessary property on Λ to have a mixing layer
which preserves the type (nw,0, δ − nw). The next result assures that this is also
sufficient.
Lemma 3.5. Let nw ∈ {1, . . . , δ − 1} and Λ(nw+1,1)∶(δ,nw) = 0. Then λ preserves the
type (nw,0, δ − nw).
Proof of Lemma 3.5. We construct D so that its type would be (nw,0, δ − nw).
Then, any vector v ∈ D can be written as a concatenation (vw ∣vb), where vw is
fixed, while {vb ∶ ∃v = (vw ∣vb) ∈D} = Fδ−nw2 . (5)
Due to Λ(nw+1,1)∶(δ,nw) being the zero matrix, the first mnw bits of the image of any
v ∈D are equal to vwΛ(1,1)∶(nw,nw), hence the first nw boxes of Im∣Dλ are white. On
the other hand, since λ is invertible, Λ has full rank, which can only be possible by
assuming that Λ(nw+1,nw+1)∶(δ,δ) is invertible. By equation (5), we therefore have{vbΛ(nw+1,nw+1)∶(δ,δ) ∶ ∃v = (vw∣vb) ∈ D} = Fmnw2 , from which we conclude that
type(Im∣Dλ) = (nw,0, δ − nw).
Note that in Lemma 3.4 and Lemma 3.5 we did not consider the cases nw = 0
and nw = δ, because they respectively correspond to the cases 1 and 2 which we
have already discussed.
At last, the case 4, type(D) = (nw,1, δ − nw − 1).
Lemma 3.6. Let both D and Im∣Dλ be of type (nw,1, δ − nw − 1), where nw ∈{1, . . . , δ − 2}. Then Λ satisfies the following properties:
(a) Λ(nw+2,1)∶(δ,nw) = 0,
(b) Λ(nw+1,1)∶(nw+1,nw) is not a full-rank matrix,
(c) 2 ≤ ∣Im∣D (Λ(nw+1,nw+1)∶(δ,nw+1))∣ < 2m(δ−nw−1),
(d) ∣Im∣D (Λ(nw+1,nw+2)∶(δ,δ))∣ = 2m(δ−nw−1).
Proof of Lemma 3.6. We proceed in four steps, assuming each time that a prop-
erty among (a), (b), (c) and (d) would not be necessary. We use again the notation
v = (vw ∣vr ∣vb), where the length of the three vectors depends on the type of D, and
we recall that vw is the same for each v ∈D.
Firstly, we look at what happens if we deny property (a). In this case, we con-
sider v = (vw ∣vr ∣vb) and v′ = (vw ∣vr ∣v′b) in D with vb ∈ kerΛ(nw+2,1)∶(δ,nw) and
v′b ∉ kerΛ(nw+2,1)∶(δ,nw). It follows that the first mnw bits of vbΛ are different from
the first mnw bits in vbΛ, hence the first nw boxes in Im∣Dλ are not white, and so
the type of D is not (nw,1, δ − nw − 1).
Similarly, if we deny the second property, we have the same conclusion by choosing
v = (vw ∣vr ∣vb) and v′ = (vw ∣v′r ∣vb), with vr ≠ v′r.
We do not go through the entire proofs of Properties (c) and (d), since they are
quite similar to what we already did above. The difference is that we need to use
the entire D instead of just two vectors v and v′, and therefore prove that Im∣Dλ
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does not have respectively a ruled box (by denying property (c)) and the right
number of black boxes (by denying property (d)).
As we did for Lemma 3.4, we can also prove that the four necessary properties
in Lemma 3.6 are also sufficient.
Lemma 3.7. Let Λ be a matrix satisfying the four properties in Lemma 3.6 for a
certain integer nw ∈ {1, . . . , δ − 2}. Then λ preserve the type (nw,1, δ − nw − 1).
Proof of Lemma 3.7. We consider D of type (nw,1, δ −nw −1), where its ruled box
is the kernel of the matrix Λ(nw+1,1)∶(nw+1,nw).
Observe that in Lemma 3.6 and Lemma 3.7 we did not consider nw = 0 and
nw = δ − 1. We discuss these cases in the following two results.
Lemma 3.8. Let type(D) = type(Im∣Dλ) = (0,1, δ − 1). Then Λ satisfies Proper-
ties (c) and (d) of Lemma 3.4, namely
(c) 2 ≤ ∣Im∣D (Λ(1,1)∶(δ,1))∣ < 2m(δ−1), and
(d) ∣Im∣D (Λ(1,2)∶(δ,δ))∣ = 2m(δ−1).
Conversely, if there exist D of type (0,1, δ−1) for which Λ satisfies the two properties
above, then Λ preserves the type of D.
Lemma 3.9. Let type(D) = type(Im∣Dλ) = (δ − 1,1,0). Then Λ satisfies Proper-
ties (b) and (c) of Lemma 3.4, namely
(b) Λ(δ,1)∶(δ,δ−1) is not a full-rank matrix, and
(c) Λδ,δ ≠ 0.
Conversely, if Λ satisfies the two properties above, then there exists D whose type
is preserved by Λ.
Note that the properties described in Lemmas 3.8 and 3.9 are particular cases
of the ones presented in Lemma 3.6. We omit the proofs of these lemmas, since
they can be obtained using the same arguments applied to prove Lemma 3.6 and
Lemma 3.7. Hence, we denoted the new properties in the same way, and, with a
slight abuse of notation, in the following we will simply refer to Lemma 3.6 and
its properties, even though when speaking of types (0,1, δ − 1) and (δ − 1,1,0) we
should be careful and use the dedicated results.
Putting everything together, we obtain the proof of Theorem 3.3 as a straight-
forward consequence of Lemmas 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9.
We remark that many matrices often used to obtain mixing layers are non-
type-preserving, simply because they usually do not satisfy property (a) of Lemma
3.6.
Corollary 3.10. If Λ(nw+2,1)∶(δ,nw) ≠ 0, for any nw ∈ {1, . . . , δ − 2}, then Λ is
non-type-preserving.
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Proof. By Theorem 3.3, if both equation (3) and property (a) are not satisfied, then
Λ is non-type-preserving. Note that Λ(nw+2,1)∶(δ,nw) is a submatrix of Λ(nw+1,1)∶(δ,nw),
so Λ(nw+2,1)∶(δ,nw) ≠ 0 implies Λ(nw+1,1)∶(δ,nw) ≠ 0.
In the next section we show how some known families of mixing layers are non-
type-preserving with respect to the subsets of Fn2 with type (nw, nr, nb) satisfying
equation (1).
3.1 Examples of non-type-preserving mixing layers
In this section we characterize some known classes of mixing layers by proving
whether they are non-type-preserving with respect to the subsets of Fn2 whose type
satisfy equation (1). The aim of this section is to highlight that the definition
of non-type-preserving mixing layer is not restrictive. Indeed, in many real-life
ciphers, such as GOST, PRESENT and AES, such kind of mixing layers are used.
With a slight abuse of notation, any of these mixing layers will simply be denoted
as non-type-preserving.
Rotation of a GOST-like cipher
In [5], the mixing layer of a GOST-like cipher is defined as the permutation matrix
Λs with s ∈ {m, . . . , (δ − 1)m}.
Let {e1, . . . ,en} be the canonical basis of Fn2 .
Definition 3.11. Let pis ∈ Sym(n) be the permutation defined by
pis = ( 1 2 . . . npis(1) pis(2) . . . pis(n) )
such that, for each 1 ≤ x ≤ n,
pis(x) = x + s mod n (6)
where m ≤ s ≤ (δ − 1)m.
The permutation binary matrix associated to pi is the following circulant matrix
Λs =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
epis(1)⋮
epis(n)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
Example 3.12. In the case of GOST, the actual values of the parameters are:
n = 32, m = 4, δ = 8 and s = 11. The right rotation by 11 bits of the GOST cipher
is the permutation matrix associated to the following permutation of 32 bits:
pi11 = ( 1 2 . . . 3212 13 . . . 11 ) .
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The mixing layer associated to pi11 is
ΛGOST = Λ11 = [ 0 121
111 0
] ,
where we denote the r × t zero matrix by 0 and the t × t identity matrix by 1t.
Proposition 3.13. Let Λs be a binary circulant permutation matrix associated to
the rotation of s bits. Then Λs is non-type-preserving if and only if m ≤ s ≤m(δ−1).
Proof. We write Λ as the block matrix
Λ = [ 0 1mδ−s
1s 0
] ,
where 1t is the t× t identity matrix. We will deal with several cases independently,
starting by s =m.
In this case, for each nw ∈ {1, . . . , δ − 1} we have Λnw+1,nw = 1m, hence equation
(3) is never satisfied. Moreover, it follows that also property (b) is never satisfied.
So, the only possibility left is that Λ satisfies both property (c) and property (d) of
Lemma 3.8, so that Λ would preserve a certain set D of type (0,1, δ − 1). However,
since Λ1,2 = 1m, it follows that property (c) cannot be satisfied by a set of such
type.
Let now s be strictly larger than m. Then, property (b) is never satisfied, hence we
only need to deal with Lemma 3.8. Note that we can still apply the same argument
as we did above, and therefore prove that property (c) cannot be applied.
These two cases together prove that for any s ∈ {m, . . . ,m(δ − 1)} the rotation of s
bits is non-type-preserving. We assume now that s is not inside the interval, and
prove that Λ is a type-preserving matrix. Trivially, if s = 0 then Λ is the identity
matrix, which is a type-preserving matrix. In the other possible cases, Λ(δ,1)∶(δ,δ−1)
is not a full-rank matrix, and Λδ,δ ≠ 0. Then, Λ satisfies respectively property (b)
and property (c) of Lemma 3.9, implying that Λ is type-preserving.
Corollary 3.14. The mixing layer of a GOST− like cipher is non-type-preserving.
Mixing layer of PRESENT
The mixing layer ΛPRESENT of PRESENT (see [7]) is a permutation matrix in
GL64(F2) defined by
pi(i) = { (16(i − 1) mod 63) + 1 if 1 ≤ i ≤ 63
64 if i = 64.
Lemma 3.15. The mixing layer of PRESENT is non-type-preserving.
Proof. First, recall that in PRESENT we have 16 bricks of dimension 4. Note that
• the bit of value 1 in position (13,4) is contained in the submatrices(ΛPRESENT)(3,1)∶(16,1) and (ΛPRESENT)(4,1)∶(16,2);
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• the bit of value 1 in position (45,12) is contained in the submatrices(ΛPRESENT)(nw+2,1)∶(16,nw), for each nw ∈ {3, . . . ,10};
• the bit of value 1 in position (61,16) is contained in the submatrices(ΛPRESENT)(nw+2,1)∶(16,nw), for each nw ∈ {11, . . . ,14}.
So (ΛPRESENT)(nw+2,1)∶(16,nw) ≠ 0, for each nw ∈ {1, . . . ,14} and hence we can apply
Corollary 3.10.
MDS matrix
Definition 3.16. A matrix over a finite field which has all the minors not equal
to zero is called MDS (Maximum Distance Separable).
Lemma 3.17. An MDS mixing layer Λ over F2m , with m > 1 the dimension of
each S-Box, is non-type-preserving.
Proof. By definition it follows Λ(nw+2,1)∶(δ,nw) ≠ 0 for each nw ∈ {1, . . . , δ−2}, hence
we can apply Corollary 3.10.
Mixing layer of an AES-like cipher
Let
MixColumns =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
M ⋯ 0⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ M
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
∈ GLδ(F2m),
where δ = 2t, for some even integer t, and we write the matrix as a 2t/2 × 2t/2 block
matrix with each block being in GL2t/2(F2m); in particular, 0 is the zero matrix in
GL2t/2(F2m) and M is an MDS matrix in GL2t/2(F2m).
With the same notation as above, let
ShiftRows =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
I1 I2 . . . I2t/2−1 I2t/2
I2t/2 I2 . . . I2t/2−2 I2t/2−1⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮ ⋮
I2 I3 ⋯ I2t/2 I1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
∈ GLδ(F2m)
be a circulant block matrix, where Ij is the matrix in GL2t/2(F2m) with the identity
element of F2m in position (j, j) and the zero element of F2m everywhere else.
Let us define Λ as the following block matrix in GLδ(F2m)
Λ = ShiftRowsT ⋅MixColumnsT =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
I1 ⋅MT I2t/2 ⋅MT . . . I3 ⋅MT I2 ⋅MT
I2 ⋅MT I1 ⋅MT . . . I4 ⋅MT I3 ⋅MT⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮ ⋮
I2t/2 ⋅MT I2t/2−1 ⋅MT ⋯ I2 ⋅MT I1 ⋅MT
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
14
Example 3.18. In the case of AES we have 16 bricks of dimension 8, that is,
δ = 16 and m = 8. Let
MixColumnsAES =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
M 0 0 0
0 M 0 0
0 0 M 0
0 0 0 M
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
∈ GL16(F28),
where we write it as a 4 × 4 block matrix with each block being in GL4(F28); in
particular, 0 is the zero matrix in GL4(F28) and
M =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
2x 3x 1x 1x
1x 2x 3x 1x
1x 1x 2x 3x
3x 1x 1x 2x
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
∈ GL4(F28)
using the hexadecimal notation.
With the same notation above, let
ShiftRowsAES =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
I1 I2 I3 I4
I4 I1 I2 I3
I3 I4 I1 I2
I2 I3 I4 I1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
∈ GL16(F28),
where Ij is the matrix in GL4(F28) with 1x in position (j, j) and 0x everywhere else.
The mixing layer of AES is the following matrix in GL16(F28)
ΛAES = MixColumnsAES ⋅ ShiftRowsAES =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
M ⋅ I1 M ⋅ I2 M ⋅ I3 M ⋅ I4
M ⋅ I4 M ⋅ I1 M ⋅ I2 M ⋅ I3
M ⋅ I3 M ⋅ I4 M ⋅ I1 M ⋅ I2
M ⋅ I2 M ⋅ I3 M ⋅ I4 M ⋅ I1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
Proposition 3.19. Λ is non-type-preserving.
Proof. Since M is an MDS matrix, Λδ,1 ≠ 0. Therefore, Λ(nw+2,1)∶(16,nw) ≠ 0, for
each nw ∈ {1, . . . , δ − 2}, so we can apply Corollary 3.10.
Corollary 3.20. The mixing layer of AES is non-type-preserving.
Proof. The result directly follows from Proposition 3.19, anyway we make explicit
the algebraic computations in the case of the AES cipher. In [15] the authors define
the mixing layer of AES using the left matrix action. Since in this paper we are
using the right action, we have to consider the transpose of ΛAES
(ΛAES)T =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
I1 ⋅MT I4 ⋅MT I3 ⋅MT I2 ⋅MT
I2 ⋅MT I1 ⋅MT I4 ⋅MT I3 ⋅MT
I3 ⋅MT I2 ⋅MT I1 ⋅MT I4 ⋅MT
I4 ⋅MT I3 ⋅MT I2 ⋅MT I1 ⋅MT
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
∈ GL16(F28).
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Finally, we note that the coefficient (16,1) of (ΛAES)T is the coefficient (4,1) of
I4 ⋅MT =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0x 0x 0x 0x
0x 0x 0x 0x
0x 0x 0x 0x
1x 1x 3x 2x
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
that is, 1x ≠ 0x. Hence (ΛAES)T(nw+2,1)∶(16,nw) ≠ 0 for each nw ∈ {1, . . . ,14}, so we
can apply Corollary 3.10.
Mixing layer of GPig2
The GPig2 mixing layer (see [22]) is non-type-preserving. Indeed, it corresponds
to the matrix
ΛGPig2 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
where (ΛGPig2)(3,1)∶(4,1) ≠ 0 and (ΛGPig2)(4,1)∶(4,2) ≠ 0, so we can apply Corollary
3.10.
4 Applications
We consider an SPNmod cipher with non-type-preserving mixing layer and we
prove, under some assumptions, that the group generated by its round functions is
primitive. Similarly, we generalize a GOST-like cipher using a non-type-preserving
mixing layer, and thus we obtain the same result under the only hypothesis on the
invertibility of the S-Boxes.
4.1 Primitivity of an SPNmod cipher
In this section we prove that an SPNmod cipher with invertible S-Boxes and non-
type-preserving mixing layer is primitive.
Let
V = V1 × V2 × . . . × Vδ
and, for 1 ≤ j ≤ δ, dim(Vj) =m.
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Theorem 4.1. Let C be an SPNmod cipher acting on the plaintext space V , in
which a round function has the form
εk = γλσk,
for the round key k ∈ V , where
• γ ∈ Sym(V ) is a non-linear permutation which acts in parallel way on each
Vj, i.e. γ is the parallel S-Box
(x1, x2, . . . , xn)γ = ((x1, . . . , xm)γ1, . . . , (xm(δ−1)+1, . . . , xn)γδ) ,
where γj ∈ Sym(Vj) and 0γj ≠ 0.
• λ ∈ Sym(V ) is a non-type-preserving mixing layer.
• σk ∈ Sym(V ) is the ⊞-translation of V by k, i.e. vσk = v ⊞ k, for any v ∈ V .
Then Γ∞ = Γ∞(C) is primitive.
Proof. Recall that ρ
def= γλ and that by Lemma 2.6 we have Γ∞ = ⟨T , ρ ⟩ . In order
to prove that Γ∞ is primitive, according to Lemma 2.8, we have to show that there
are no non-trivial proper subgroup D of (V,⊞) and v ∈ V such that
Dρ = v ⊞D.
Since 0 ∈ D, we can take v = 0ρ, hence it is enough to prove that if D ≠ {0} is
a proper subgroup of Z2n , then Dρ ≠ 0ρ ⊞D. Clearly, an invertible parallel S-Box
maps any set having a type to another set having the same type, since each S-box
is a bijection. Hence D and Dγ share the same type and, by Lemma 2.11, this is
the same type as 0ρ⊞D. Therefore 0ρ⊞D cannot be equal to Dρ if we prove that,
for any non-trivial proper subgroup D of Z2n , Dγ and Dρ = (Dγ)λ have different
types. Finally, the latter statement follows from Theorem 3.3, since by hypothesis
λ is non-type-preserving.
Remark 4.2. The cipher GPig2 [22] is an example of SPNmod cipher satisfying
the hypothesis of Theorem 4.1 and so the group generated by its round functions is
primitive.
4.2 Generalization of the mixing layer of a GOST-like cipher
and primitivity
In this section, we use a known structure of a block cipher to give an example of a
cipher that is primitive if a non-type-preserving mixing layer is used. In particular,
we consider a GOST-like cipher, defined in [5], with a generalized mixing layer using
any non-type-preserving matrix instead of a rotation. Then we prove that the group
generated by the round functions is primitive if the S-Boxes are invertible.
We give the definition of a generalized GOST-like cipher and of the correspond-
ing group generated by the round functions, arranging the definition of a GOST-like
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cipher given in [5] by substituting the rotation by m ≤ s ≤m(δ − 1) with any non-
type-preserving mixing layer.
The plaintext space is V = V 1 × V 2, where V 1, V 2 are two copies of Fn2 , and
the key space K is another copy of Fn2 . Clearly V inherits both group structures
componentwise from V 1, V 2.
Let us consider
• V i, for i = 1,2, as the Cartesian product
V i = V i1 ×⋯× V iδ (7)
of δ > 1 spaces V ij , all of the same dimension m > 1;
• a non-linear map (parallel S-Box) γ ∈ Sym(V i) which acts in parallel way on
each V ij , where γj ∈ Sym(V ij ) and 0γj ≠ 0;
• a non-type-preserving linear map λ ∈ Sym(V i);
• ρ
def= γλ ∈ Sym(V i).
For (k1, k2) ∈ V = V 1 × V 2, consider the ⊞-translation on V by (k1, k2)
σ(k1,k2) ∶ V 1 × V 2 Ð→ V 1 × V 2(x1, x2) z→ (x1 ⊞ k1, x2 ⊞ k2).
We now introduce a formal 2n×2n matrix, which implements the Feistel struc-
ture,
P = [0 1
1 ρ
] , (8)
where 0 and 1 are n×n matrices. This acts (on the right) on (x1, x2) ∈ V = V 1×V 2
by (x1, x2)P = (x2, x1 ⊕ x2ρ). (9)
We are ready to define a round function of a generalized GOST-like cipher. LetH = K ×K = V be the key space, a round takes the form
σk P σh, (10)
with k,h ∈ H.
The corresponding group generated by the round functions will thus be
Γ∞ = ⟨σk P σh ∶ k,h ∈ H ⟩ .
Theorem 4.3. Let C be a generalized GOST-like cipher as defined above. If the
parallel S-Box γ is a permutation of V i, in other words γ ∈ Sym(V i), then Γ∞(C)
is primitive.
Proof. The proof is the same as the one given in Section 4 of [5], which uses the
Goursat’s Lemma [18], until the case Dρ = 0ρ ⊞ D with D a non-trivial proper
subgroup of Z2n is reached. Finally, for this case we can proceed as done in the
proof of Theorem 4.1 and apply Theorem 3.3.
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5 Conclusions and open problems
A key feature of a block cipher is the ability of resisting against known attacks,
such as differential, linear and algebraic attacks. In this work we focus on the
imprimitivity attack proposed in [23]; we approached this problem in the case of
block ciphers with addition mod 2n as key mixing function. Our main result is the
characterization of binary matrices (associated to mixing layers) accordingly to the
newly introduced property of being type-preserving. Then, we show how non-type-
preserving matrices assure resistance against imprimitivity attacks (see Theorems
4.1 and 4.3).
The study of primitivity in block ciphers is dependent on the key mixing function.
Therefore, it could be interesting to adapt the definition of non-type-preserving
mixing layer to other actions of the key. Future directions will be the analyses of
n-bits block ciphers whose key mixing function is the addition mod 2m, acting in
parallel on disjoint subsets of m∣n bits of the state. We remark that the case m = n
is the topic of this work, while the case m = 1 implies that the key mixing function
is the addition mod 2 between the key and the state, hence it is already discussed
in [13].
A further work will be to design an instance of the generalized GOST-like cipher,
presented in Section 4.2, by choosing a non-type-preserving mixing layer, a parallel
S-Box and a key-schedule and then to make a more detailed analysis of its security,
including the study of classical statistical attacks. This approach could indeed give
new insights on ciphers using addition mod 2n as key mixing function.
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